Abstract
While formal citizenship refers to membership in a political community, active citizenship is something that must be learned over time, according to Voet (1998) . Its ideal form-full citizenship-implies that individuals are ready to take joint responsibility for policy decisions and have a willingness to accept political office, becoming capable, active citizens, not subordinate ones. Active citizenship can also be exercised outside national and municipal politics conducted through political parties, within civil society associations (Casanova 2001; Stoltz 2002) .
People who perceive themselves as peripheral in society, which is common among immigrants and the children of immigrants, rarely engage in the national political parties. More often, they involve themselves in civil society associations (Stoltz 2002) .
It is therefore relevant to investigate how immigrants and their children engage themselves politically through civil society organizations and to see how these organizations relate to different levels of public governance (Odmalm 2007) . A decade ago, José Casanova (2001) noted that religion had returned as an important civil society actor in several political arenas. The Nordic countries are considered among the most secular, but even there some researchers claim that change is taking place (cf.
Martikainen in this volume). It is thus relevant to pay attention to religious lobbying groups and organizations active in civil society when describing active citizenship.
Our purpose in this article is to discuss the conditions and opportunities for those who seek to exercise active citizenship in their capacity as Muslims. We have concentrated on the active citizenship that has sprung from national umbrella organizations, being aware that much, if not most, Islamic active citizenship is performed locally (Otterbeck 225 2010) . First, we will describe some important starting points for religious political participation in Sweden, then we look at Muslim political, civil society organizations. In addition, we will discuss their cooperation with established political parties and how these parties relate to Muslims. Finally, we will focus on a few cases in which Muslims seek positions in national politics. The aim is to illustrate empirically the conditions for active citizenship on a national level when performed from an Islamic, religious starting point. Further, we problematize the political interpretation of this active citizenship and show how both positive and negative attitudes are based on an understanding of Muslims as 'the excluded other'. Fetzer and Soper (2005) argue that a country's political opportunity structures and political ideology make up the framework for active citizenship. A society's religiopolitical history, especially its church-state relations, tends to shape institutional structures and laws, but also the main ideology of the state. Political opportunity structures refer, for example, to the possibility of obtaining formal citizenship, principles of election participation, and the political distribution of power within the state. That it is possible to obtain Swedish citizenship after only five years' residence (and be an active citizen without citizenship) is of importance to Muslims since many are immigrants. Further, the changing role of the Swedish Church over time and the secularization of the Swedish state have had profound institutional and legal consequences. For example, the religious freedom law (1952), the recognition of the 'free churches' (Christian churches other than the Swedish Church) as qualified for state grants (1971) , and the anti-discrimination laws that have gradually included religious affiliation as a recognized cause of discrimination , have shaped opportunities for Muslims' active citizenship.
The discussions of multiculturalism in Sweden took off in the early 1970s and led to the policy change often referred to as the minority policy decision (det minoritetspolitiska beslutet) from 1975 on equality, freedom and cultural cooperation between the majority, old minorities and new immigrant groups (Proposition 1975:26) . The political idea behind the policy was that the right to cultural diversity would lead to understanding, (Roy 2004 ; in a Swedish context, see Otterbeck & Bevelander 2006) . In contrast, Silvestri (2007) suggests that the analysis of Muslim attitudes to active citizenship and Muslim patterns of mobilization in the public sphere should assume that Muslims are no different from other individuals. It is analytically unproductive to assume that all Muslims belong to a particular socio-political category.
Sweden and Religion
The Swedish state has far-reaching ambitions to organize social life. It is common for civil society agents to have an economic-sometimes an organizational-cooperation with the state, the county administrative board, or municipality. Local projects, like dialogue groups or anti-racist initiatives, are often sponsored by one of these three levels of public governance, instead of being dependent on contributions from religious organizations, foundations or businesses, as they would be in many other countries (Berggren & Trägårdh 2006) . Civil society engagement is frequently channelled through social clubs linked to the labour movement or religious organizations that in turn often collaborate with the state. A large proportion of Swedes are members of a club. For example, 96% of people in the age group 25-64 belonged to a club in the year 2000; half of them claimed to be active (Lindgren 2008) . Further, in 2008, more than 7.5 million people were members or active in a religious community that had a financial or organizational relationship with the state (the Swedish Church 2010; SST 2010).
Either you are a member of the Swedish Church (approx. 6.7 million) or in a (Otterbeck 2000) and to try to lobby politically to achieve specific minority rights, for the benefit of, for example, school children (halal food). In 1990, FIFS and SMF founded the Muslim Council of Sweden (Sveriges Muslimska Råd: SMR). It was assigned the task of representing the organizations before the authorities, disseminating information, participating in public debate, and setting up mosques and Islamic schools (Otterbeck 2000) . Initially, SMR was led by Mahmoud Aldebe, who has become, over time, one of the few nationally known Muslims (see below). Today, SMR is described as a non-profit religious organization. It is not a member-based organization; rather, it consists of a union of organizations that includes, other than the founders, groups like Islamic Relief, a humanitarian organization.
Political Parties and the Understanding of Muslims
We will now look into how the political activities of Muslim organizations are dealt with by the political elite, something that is of crucial importance, shaping the conditions of Muslim active citizenship. In addition to the political opportunities that were created for Muslims by SST, the Swedish authorities and political parties have used SST's network to find Muslims with which to cooperate. At the local level, SST's structures might not be as important, but in this article we concentrate on national politics.
Sweden's Christian Social Democrats, better known under the name 'the Brotherhood Movement', was founded in 1929 and is a self-governing organization within the Social Democratic Workers' Party (Lundberg 1988) . 
Reasons for Cooperation
The Brotherhood Movement justifies cooperation with SMR by stressing the importance of dialogue. A recurring argument is that Muslim communities face a similar problem to that which the Christian Social Democrats faced before their organization was founded, namely that of finding a satisfactory way of joining their faith with other forms of societal commitments. A further argument is that dialogue may counter social exclusion (Weiderud 2006) . It is seen as taking a risk not to engage in dialogue with Muslim organizations because of ideological differences, lest both Islamic extremism and Islamophobia gain a foothold instead (Weiderud 2009 (Carlbom 2006; Roald 2002) . Using Mandaville's (2007) categorization of socio-political trends among Europe's Muslims, SMR can be described as 'communitarianist'. These tend to be politically pragmatic, while still having religious ideals as normative standards for their political work. They usually have a strong commitment to issues relating to (minority) rights of Muslims, and they tend to seek cooperation with and support from parties in the political mainstream.
The Brotherhood Movement claims that it does not accept extremism, but sees it as its task to bridge gaps between different religious communities. They believe that the (Sahlberg et al. 1998 :31, our translation).
The depictions of Muslims by the Brotherhood Movement often return to the idea that Muslims can be described as a group with certain needs that must be met, precisely on the grounds that they are Muslims (cf. Allievi 2003; Maussen 2007) . It is assumed that active citizenship is intimately linked with the religious identity, and that it is through an emphasis on that identity that Muslims can articulate and defend their interests. In the editorial, the Social Democratic Muslims present themselves as a mainstream option. The editorial states that only extremist forces profit from the addressing of peripheral issues; both Islamic extremists and those who want to increase fear and Islamophobia and limit Muslims' rights are referred to as extremists (Habib et al. 2010 ).
Muslim Social Democrats in Search of a Voice
The magazine features a manifesto for Muslim Social Democrats. Muslim identity is defined in an inclusive manner and it stresses that identity is based on the understanding that 'faith, practice and culture are expressed in many forms and different people attach different meaning to why they call themselves Muslims' (Habib et al. 2010 , our translation). The preference for Social Democracy, it is explained, is due to the party's ideas of a common social structure, which goes hand in hand with Islam's passion for if not downright sinister (Cato 2012 ). This happens all over Europe (Glynn 2009 
Individual and Collective Political Projects
The conception of tolerance of pluralistic liberal societies not only requires believers to recognize that they must reasonably reckon with the persistence of disagreement in their dealings with non-believers and members of other faiths.
The same recognition is also required of unbelievers in their dealings with believers in a liberal political culture. (Habermas 2008:112) Those who pursue an active citizenship motivated by either an Islamic sense of justice or the conviction that Muslims need representatives are doing so in a defining moment in Sweden's political history. Organizing religious lobbying on school issues or to be able to enjoy benefits already given to other religious groups, seems quite uncontroversial. Over time, Muslim organizations and civil society associations have acquired many partners, not least through the networks of SST, an important political opportunity structure for religious activist at large. In these contexts, Muslims have been able to pursue issues in line with the multiculturalism policy of the society and outside the attention of the media. Their work has led to reasonable, pragmatic solutions to cooperate with Muslim organizations and individuals. The latter try to tame the beast, the former to exorcise it. Public Muslim active citizenship in Sweden is thus to a certain degree created by Swedish structures but is in the same time rejected as something atypical and problematic, a paradox that has to be addressed and examined in a democratic and multicultural society.
